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A short notice on Robert Heinaman’s account of Aristotle’s definition of 
ki/nhsiv in Physica III 
                          
 Javier Echeñique Sosa (PhD – St Andrews) 
     
In Physica III. 1-2 we can find at least two explicit definitions of change 
(ki/nhsiv):1   
 (1) The actuality of what potentially is, qua such (h( tou~ duna/mei o1ntov 
e0ntele/xeia, h[\| toiou~ton. Phys. 201a10- 11)2 
 (2) The actuality of the potential, qua potential (h9 tou~ dunatou~, h[| dunato/n, 
e0ntele/xeia. Phys. 201b4-6).  
This definition of change has been the focus of intense debate amongst modern 
scholars.3 In an influential article, Robert Heinaman has advanced an interpretation of 
this definition, according to which the potentiality involved in the definition of change 
is a potentiality to change (to F) – as opposed to a potentiality for being the end-state of 
a change (i.e. F). Heinaman points to different versions of the definition in which the 
potentiality involved in change is explicitly specified as a potentiality to change (to F). 
I will consider what Heinaman takes to be the unambiguous formulations:4 
                                                          
1  I won't consider the one at the end of Phys. III. 3 (202b26-7), which I take to be a 
: Clarendon Press. I 
94). 'Is Aristotle's Definition of Change Circular?', 
ferent formulations of the definition in the Physics is provided by 
reformulation of the original definition in terms of agency and patiency.  
2 I use W. D. Ross edition, Ross, W. D (1936): Aristotle’s Physics. Oxford
follow here most commentators (including Heinaman himself) in rejecting Ross’ translation of 
e0ntele/xeia as “actualization” (on this, see Vigo, A. (1995). Aristóteles: Física Libros III-IV. 
Buenos Aires, Biblos. Pp. 109-110).  
3 Some examples are: Heinaman, R. (19
Apeiron 27: 25-37;  Kosman, L. A. (1969). 'Aristotle's Definition of Motion', Phronesis 14: 
40-62; Kostman, J. (1987). 'Aristotle's Definition of Change', History of Philosophy Quarterly 
4: 3-16; Waterlow, S. (1982). Nature, Change and Agency in Aristotle’s Physics, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.   
4 A complete list of the dif
Heinaman, R. (1994). The ones I quote, (2), (3) and (7) (corresponding to my (3), (4) and (5) 
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-10). 
nhtou~), 
suggestion here that this must also be the case with the definition of change itself (i.e. 
 (3) The actuality of the alterable (tou~ a0lloiwtou~), qua alterable (Phys. 
201a11-12). 
 (4) The actuality of the house-buildable (tou~ oi0kodomhtou~), qua 
house-buildable (Phys. 201b9
 (5) The actuality of what potentially is changing (tou~ duna/mei o1ntov ki
qua potentially changing (inferred from Phys. 202a3-4).  
 These formulations are taken by Heinaman to complete what in (1) and (2) is 
omitted, rather than to be in conflict with them. This is particularly obvious in (5), for 
kinhtou~ and the qua clause here specified can easily be taken to complete (1). What I 
want to argue is that, even though Heinaman's interpretation of the definition of change 
and the evidence he points at in his article do show that there is an ambiguity in the 
definition of change as to which kind of potentiality Aristotle is referring to, they do not 
decisively establish that the potentiality involved in the definition of change is not a 
potentiality for being the end-state of a change. 
 First of all, there is no such definition as (5) in Aristotle's text. Heinaman argues 
that we can safely infer (5) from the following passage: 
As we said, everything that produces change is also changed, if it is potentially 
changeable (to_ duna/mei o1n kinhto/n) and its not being changed is rest (the not 
being changed of that which admits of change is rest). For to operate on this, 
qua such, is just what it is to produce change, and this it does by contact, so that 
it will at the same time also be acted upon (Phys. 202a3-7).5 
 The words to_ duna/mei o1n kinhto/n are here being used to define rest (h0remi/a), 
which being the privation of change, can only be ascribed to what is duna/mei kinhto/n, 
that is, to what is potentially changeable. That is, being a privation, rest must 
presuppose the concept of change and must be defined in terms of it. But there is no 
                                                                                                                                                                      
respectively), are taken from this article.   
5 Aristotle continues: "because of this, change is the actuality of the changeable (kinhto/n) qua 
changeable ...." (202a7). This explicit passage would support Heinaman's view if it were not for 
the fact that kinhto/n is not here completing to_ duna/mei o1n, but replacing it. Moreover, this 
passage occurs in a context in which Aristotle is working out his reformulation of the definition 
of change in terms of agency and patiency, and Heinaman has not shown that this reformulation 
is equivalent to the original definition. It is also worth pointing out that Edward Hussey 
excludes this passage (202a7-9) from his translation (See Hussey, E. (1983). Physics: Books III 
and IV. Clarendon Aristotle Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press).  
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at about (3) and (4)? First, it is worth noting that (3) and (4) are not 
definiti
ase is strongly suggested, first, by the general definition of 
change
ds:  
ing>, change is the actuality of what is potentially, qua such, for 
e actuality of what is alterable, qua alterable, is alteration, ... (Phys. 
 
200b26 o which there is no change over and above the categories, 
                                                          
that change itself must be circularly defined in terms of what has the potentiality to 
change). Moreover, to_ duna/mei o1n kinhto/n is not, literally understood, "what 
potentially is changing" (as Heinaman translates it), but "what potentially is 
changeable".  
But wh
ons of change as such, but of alteration and house-building respectively. The 
only general definitions of change that we get from Aristotle (apart from the one at the 
end of Chapter 3 in terms of agency and patiency) are (1) and (2). I think that, (5) being 
eliminated from the picture, what definitions (3) and (4) show (jointly with the three 
remaining definitions of locomotion, increase and decrease, and coming to be and 
ceasing to be at Phys. 201a10ff) is, at most, a conflict with the general definitions of 
change, (1) and (2).   
That this is the c
 - (1) - itself  as the e0ntele/xeia of what potentially is (tou~ duna/mei o1ntov), 
where, in the absence of independent evidence like (5), "what potentially is" is not to be 
taken as meaning "what potentially is changing". There is no suggestion in Aristotle's 
texts that the participle o1n of the verb 'to be' in the expression to_ duna/mei o1n (to 
formulate (5) in the nominative) is to be taken exclusively as elliptical or as a copula; 
i.e. to_ duna/mei o1n F, the substituend of F being kinhto/n. Moreover, this latter is the 
only substituend which Heinaman can appeal to, and we have already noticed that it 
will not do the job Heinaman requires, for it means "changeable", thus rendering the 
meaning of the expression unintelligible (i.e. what is potentially changeable).  
Secondly, the first definition of change - (1) above - is introduced by the 
following wor
Having distinguished what is actually and what is potentially according to each 
kind <of be
instance, th
201a9-12)6  
In the first two lines, Aristotle is pointing out to his previous argument (Phys. 
-201a9), according t
and more specifically, that change always takes place between opposite 
6 Translations are mine. 
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instance, Aristotle's claim 
at "th
biguity in 
determinations 7  (e.g. white and black, complete and incomplete, upwards and 
downwards, etc.) in certain categories. This is just a specification of Aristotle's previous 
discussion in Phys. I. 7, according to which change is always from form to privation, 
and from privation to form, where privation and form, at least in the less problematic 
case of non-substantial becoming, are to be understood as predicates. What Aristotle 
now means by saying that he has distinguished what is actually (tou~ me_n e0ntelexei/a|) 
and what is potentially (tou~ de_ duna/mei) according to each category, is that change 
takes place between something X being potentially F at t (being actually non-F) and the 
same thing X being actually F at t’, where F and non-F are opposite predicates within 
the same category. There is no suggestion in the line of argument developed in the 
whole preface to the definition of change for the claim that, as subscribed to the 
categories, to_ duna/mei is to be understood as what is potentially changing to F, rather 
than what potentially is F.  
 And finally, the conflict is stressed by some evidence which Heinaman does not 
consider as telling against his own interpretation. I mean, for 
th e bronze is potentially a statue (o( xalko_v duna/mei a0ndria/v), but yet it is not 
the actuality of bronze qua bronze that is change" (Phys. 201a30), where it is natural to 
complete the sentence with "but the actuality of the bronze qua potentially a statue". 
Heinaman thinks these lines do not constitute evidence against his interpretation 
because he reads the immediately following lines (201a31-32) as follows: "For the 
bronze and to be potentially changing (kinhtw|~) are not the same..." – following the 
insertion of kinhtw|~ in some MSS. The insertion of kinhtw|~ however, is extremely 
dubious: it is omitted in the parallel text of Metaphysica 1065b26, which is probably 
why David Ross omits it in his Oxford edition of the Physica.   
 I conclude, therefore, that Heinaman's interpretation of the definition of change 
and the evidence he points at in his article can only show that there is an am
the definition of change as to which kind of potentiality Aristotle is referring to (an 
ambiguity that is, perhaps, deeply rooted in Aristotle’s metaphysics, and that must be 
adequately explained). They do not decisively establish, however, that the potentiality 
                                                          
7  I use the word 'determination' instead of predicate, because substantial form is not a predicate. 
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